So, I've wondered this before, but mostly in a theoretical sense. Why isn't my bedroom with the door locked a secure container? I just happen to be in the storage container with the gun. As long as I put it away in a safe, or put a trigger lock on it, or put it in a holster before I unlock the door, it seems like it should be a loophole.
Commonwealth v. Parzick, 64 Mass.App.Ct. 846 (2005)
Appeals Court of Massachusetts,
Berkshire.
Decided Oct. 26, 2005.
Background: Defendant was convicted by jury in the Superior Court Department, Berkshire County, Daniel A. Ford, J., of improper
storage of a firearm and possession of a firearm without a valid firearm identification (FID) card. Defendant appealed.
Holdings: The Appeals Court, Duffly, J., held that:
(1) defendant's bedroom was not a "securely locked container," for purposes of statute criminalizing improper storage of a firearm;
DUFFLY, J.
A jury found the defendant, Stephen Parzick, guilty of improper storage of a firearm in violation of G.L. c. 140, § 131L, and possession of
a firearm without a valid firearm identification (FID) card, in violation of G.L. c. 269, § 10(h ). In his appeal, the defendant contends that guns
stored in an unlocked bedroom closet within a locked bedroom are "secured in a locked container," as required by G.L. c. 140, § 131L. He also
claims that (1) the licensing authority’s failure to notify him of the denial of his license renewal application entitled him to assume that his
expired license remained valid; (2) G.L. c. 140, § 129B(12), provides an affirmative defense when an otherwise valid license has expired; and
(3) the trial judge erred in failing to give a requested instruction that the law requires an applicant for an FID card to be notified in writing of
the denial of his application. We affirm.
[1] Summary of facts and proceedings. At trial, the defendant filed motions for required findings of not guilty both at the close of the
Commonwealth's case and at the close of all of the evidence. In our review of the denial of his motions for required findings of not guilty, we
determine whether the evidence, viewed "together with permissible inferences from that evidence [and] in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth," was sufficient to satisfy the jury that all of the essential elements of the crime existed beyond a reasonable doubt. >
Commonwealth v. Platt, 440 Mass. 396, 400, 798 N.E.2d 1005 (2003). "The relevant question is whether the evidence would permit a jury
to find guilt, not whether the evidence requires such a finding." Commonwealth v. Lydon, 413 Mass. 309, 312, 597 N.E.2d 36 (1992), quoting
from Commonwealth v. Brown, 401 Mass. 745, 747, 519 N.E.2d 1291 (1988).
The defendant was friends with Debra Mayernik and her husband, both of whom worked for him in exchange for lodging in his home.
Mayernik's son, seventeen year old Stephen Fish, also came to live in the house. The defendant did not permit Fish, who had his own
bedroom, to be alone in the house or to have access to any bedroom other than his own. The defendant was home on August 19, 2001, when
he discovered that several rifles he owned (as well as other items of value) were missing from his bedroom closet where he stored them,
leaning against the wall in the corner behind his clothes. The closet was not equipped with a lock. When he was not at home, the defendant
barricaded the closet door with boxes and other items and locked his bedroom door. That door was fitted with a knob lock that could be locked
from inside the room. Mayernik had an identical lock on her bedroom door, which she opened from the outside by inserting a bobby pin into
the hole in the knob.
The defendant told Fish's mother of the theft, and she immediately called the police. One of the responding officers accompanied the
defendant into his bedroom to determine how many guns were stolen. Upon observing where the guns were kept, the officer informed the
defendant that his firearms were improperly stored as they did not have trigger locks and were not stored in a "gun-securing cabinet" or in a
properly secured room. Fish returned home during the investigation and admitted to the theft of the guns.
Asked by the officers whether he had an FID card, the defendant said he did, but had not picked it up from the police station. Because his
FID card had expired, the defendant had applied for a new card on January 5, 2000, some nineteen months before the date he discovered that
his guns were stolen. There was testimony from the officer in charge of processing firearms license applications that the defendant's application
had been denied at some point, but written notice of the denial had not been sent to the defendant. There was no evidence of the date of
the denial, but as of August 19, 2001, the date of the offense, the defendant had not received notice of denial and had not inquired about the
status of his application.
Discussion. 1. Improper storage of a firearm. The defendant argues that his bedroom was a container within the meaning of > G.L. c. 140,
§ 131L, and that he was not in violation of the statute because the bedroom door was locked. The defendant's interpretation of the statute
ignores the requirement that a container must not only be "locked" but also "secure." > Section 131L, inserted by St.1998, c. 180, § 47,
provides in relevant part as follows:
"(a ) It shall be unlawful to store or keep any firearm ... in any place unless such weapon is secured in a locked container or equipped with
a tamper-resistant mechanical lock or other safety device, properly engaged so as to render such weapon inoperable by any person other than
the owner ..." (emphasis added). > (FN1)
[2] [3] The phrase "secured in a locked container" is not defined by the statute. > (FN2) "When a statute does not define its words we give
them their usual and accepted meanings, as long as these meanings are consistent with the statutory purpose." Commonwealth v. Zone Book,
Inc., 372 Mass. 366, 369, 361 N.E.2d 1239 (1977). The Legislature's intent may be ascertained "from all [the statute's] words construed by
the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be
remedied and the main object to be accomplished."
[4] Read in its entirety, the statutory scheme governing gun control evinces a legislative purpose "to prevent the temptation and the ability
to use firearms to inflict harm, be it negligently or intentionally, on another or on oneself." > Commonwealth v. Lee, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 518,
523, 409 N.E.2d 1311 (1980). As we have had occasion to observe, "[t]he goal of firearms control legislation in Massachusetts is to limit
access to deadly weapons by irresponsible persons" and the Legislature has adopted a wide range of methods "to accomplish this goal,
including ... the imposition of serious penalties for infractions of the firearms control laws." > Ruggiero v. Police Commr. of Boston, 18
Mass.App.Ct. 256, 258, 464 N.E.2d 104 (1984). We note as well that > G.L. c. 140, § 123, inserted by St.1998, c. 180, § 19, requires firearms
dealers to give written warning to gun purchasers and to "conspicuously post at each purchase counter ... in bold type not less than one inch
in height [the following]: 'IT IS UNLAWFUL TO STORE OR KEEP A FIREARM, RIFLE, SHOTGUN OR MACHINE GUN IN ANY
PLACE UNLESS THAT WEAPON IS EQUIPPED WITH A TAMPER-RESISTANT SAFETY DEVICE OR IS STORED OR KEPT IN A
SECURELY LOCKED CONTAINER ' " (emphasis added).
The use of the word "secured" in > G.L. c. 140, § 131L, comports with its use in > G.L. c. 140, § 123, and indicates that the container must
not merely be locked, but securely locked. See > Commonwealth v. Lee, 10 Mass.App.Ct. at 522, 409 N.E.2d 1311, quoting from > Libby v.
New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 273 Mass. 522, 525-526, 174 N.E. 171 (1930) (statute is to be interpreted so that "no clause, sentence or word
shall prove superfluous, void or insignificant if by any other construction it may be made useful and pertinent"). The Connecticut Supreme
Court, in > State v. Wilchinski, 242 Conn. 211, 700 A.2d 1 (1997), interpreting a similar statute, > (FN3) defined the word "secure" to mean
"to 'hold fast,' to 'tie down,' to 'put beyond hazard of losing,' or 'inviolable,' " as well as "to relieve from exposure to danger." > Id. at 224-225,
700 A.2d 1, quoting from Webster's Third New Intl. Dictionary 2053 (1963). That court concluded that the only logical definition of "secure"
in the context of the statute was "one that focuses both on preventing minors from gaining access to guns and on preventing them from being
able to misuse the weapon." > Id. at 225, 700 A.2d 1.
[5] We likewise conclude that > G.L. c. 140, § 131L, requires guns to be maintained in locked containers in a way that will deter all but the
most persistent from gaining access. Even a door locked with a key is not secure if the key is hanging next to the lock. Assuming the
defendant's bedroom to be a container, and further that it was locked at the time of the theft, > (FN4) the defendant was in violation of > G.L.
c. 140, § 131L, because the lock was easily defeated by anyone with access to a bobby pin and did not prevent ready access by anyone other
than the lawful owner. Because the evidence supports a finding that the room was not a securely locked container, denial of the defendant's
motions for a required finding of not guilty was proper.
Judgments affirmed.
(FN1.) None of the defendant's guns was so equipped.
(FN2.) Although our courts have not interpreted the phrase "secured in a locked container," we have said that the "usual and natural
meaning" of "a container is 'a receptacle (as a box or jar) or a formed or flexible covering for the packing or shipment of articles, goods
or commodities' ... ; and a receptacle is 'one that receives and contains something.' " > Commonwealth v. Lee, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 518,
523 n. 3, 409 N.E.2d 1311 (1980), quoting from Webster's Third New Intl. Dictionary 491, 1894 (1971). We assume, without deciding,
that a bedroom may constitute a container for purposes of the statute.
(FN3.) > Connecticut Gen.Stat. § 29-37i (2003) provides in pertinent part as follows: "No person shall store or keep any loaded firearm
on any premises under his control if he knows or reasonably should know that a minor is likely to gain access to the firearm ... unless
such person (1) keeps the firearm in a securely locked box or other container or in a location which a reasonable person would believe
to be secure...."
(FN4.) We think the jury might have inferred from the evidence that the defendant, who testified that he locked the bedroom door when
he was not at home, was at home when Fish took the guns. The defendant also testified that he had informed his insurance company that
he did not see any sign of forced entry and that he assumed that Fish had simply walked into the bedroom to steal the guns. The
conviction might have been upheld on the ground that the room was not locked. Because it was not argued, we do not base our decision
on this view of the facts.
![[rofl]](/xen/styles/default/xenforo/smilies.vb/013.gif "ROFL [rofl]")
![[thinking]](/xen/styles/default/xenforo/smilies.vb/010.gif "Thinking [thinking]")
