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So you cannot carry into (or onto real property comprising) any primary and or secondary schools or at school sponsored activities (unless approved by school officials).Sec. 53a-217b. Possession of a weapon on school grounds: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of possession of a weapon on school grounds when, knowing that such person is not licensed or privileged to do so, such person possesses a firearm or deadly weapon, as defined in section 53a-3, (1) in or on the real property comprising a public or private elementary or secondary school, or (2) at a school-sponsored activity as defined in subsection (h) of section 10-233a.
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to the otherwise lawful possession of a firearm (1) by a person for use in a program approved by school officials in or on such school property or at such school-sponsored activity, (2) by a person in accordance with an agreement entered into between school officials and such person or such person's employer, (3) by a peace officer, as defined in subdivision (9) of section 53a-3, while engaged in the performance of such peace officer's official duties, or (4) by a person while traversing such school property for the purpose of gaining access to public or private lands open to hunting or for other lawful purposes, provided such firearm is not loaded and the entry on such school property is permitted by the local or regional board of education.
(c) Possession of a weapon on school grounds is a class D felony.
However, if that college or univeristy has no carry signs posted than carrying there is prohibited by law.
Bottom line is, if the property or business owner asks you to not carry, or there is a posted sign stating no carry; and you continue to carry there your in violation of that statute which, if found out, could lead to possible arrest (for example trespass or breach of peace), possible revocation of pistol permit, and or possibly suffer the penalties, including forfeit of the firearm, detailed in Sec. 29-37. Penalties - http://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/pub/Chap529.htm#Sec29-37.htm(e) The issuance of any permit to carry a pistol or revolver does not thereby authorize the possession or carrying of a pistol or revolver in any premises where the possession or carrying of a pistol or revolver is otherwise prohibited by law or is prohibited by the person who owns or exercises control over such premises.
Some are liable to come in and say "Concealed means Concealed". The choice to carry in places where its clear that carry is prohibited is up the person carrying the gun.Sec. 29-37. Penalties. (a) Any person violating any provision of section 29-28 or 29-31 shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than three years or both, and any pistol or revolver found in the possession of any person in violation of any of said provisions shall be forfeited.
where are u getting this from?
He's getting it from the statute.
Heres the totality of it. If you carry onto/into a college you are at worst violating the statute that gives a property owner or manager the right to bar firearms from entry. Here's the kicker though, if you ignore this and are caught you have committed the crime of criminal trespass, a very minor misdemeanor.
Sec. 29-37. Penalties. (a) Any person violating any provision of section 29-28 or 29-31 shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than three years or both, and any pistol or revolver found in the possession of any person in violation of any of said provisions shall be forfeited.
Signage at an entryway is considered to be adequate notice that firearms are prohibited.
The statute references are right there in my previous post...Can you provide a statute reference?
The wording of that section of law makes MGL look like an exercise in precision.So, through all this garbage, does CT have binding signage or is it trespass standard? It smells like they have binding signage but that there is no standard imposed in the law, which leaves one to make wild assed guesses.
No, actually it's a serious felony.
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/pub/Chap529.htm#Sec29-37.htm
We're talking about a lifetime loss of gun rights if you're convicted for violating that.
CT caselaw isn't my area of expertise, but from everything I've seen there's no set standard for how to determine when you're in violation of this law.
But I'm still confused. By strict definition, this would be a felony because you could be imprisoned for more than a year. (feel free to set me straight if that premise is wrong).
But realistically, trespass is always treated as a petty crime. Although the statute allows for 3 years, you will most likely get a fine and accelerated rehabilitation.
So, through all this garbage, does CT have binding signage or is it trespass standard? It smells like they have binding signage but that there is no standard imposed in the law, which leaves one to make wild assed guesses.
The wording of that section of law makes MGL look like an exercise in precision.
It could mean any of the following:
- A carry permit is completely invalid in any location where the owner prohibits guns, the gun owner can be treated as if completely unlicensed, and it's the obligation of the permit holder to find out if such a prohibition exists.
- As above, but only if notice is posted
- A permit is still valid, but the wording means that the permit does not give someone the right to carry in a location if they are specifically told they cannot, and you must leave if asked (i.e., it doesn't convey the right to tell a store owner "sorry, you have no choice, I have a permit")
- Violation of a sign, or perhaps even of an unposted policy, may be trespass.
My guess is "nobody really knows for sure". It's hard to get objectively good data when most of the parties you could ask will have their own agenda and spin it the way that want to read it, rather than citing some objective determination (for example, precedent setting case law).
But I'm still confused. By strict definition, this would be a felony because you could be imprisoned for more than a year. (feel free to set me straight if that premise is wrong).
But realistically, trespass is always treated as a petty crime. Although the statute allows for 3 years, you will most likely get a fine and accelerated rehabilitation.
Re signage: When I gave this example to my attorney, he felt this met the "reasonable man" sniff test. Like you said, there is no case law.
People who carry should be aware of the possible legal ramifications if they choose to carry in places that are gun free zones.
Dcmdon, ask James Goldberg how the LEO's knew he was carrying in Chili's. People can and do inadvertently expose their concealed firearm.
Most people never know that others around them are carrying. Its rare for someone legally carrying to be charged when someone sees their holstered firearm, but as the Goldberg arrest at Chili's shows, it can happen.
believe property owners have the right to arbitrarily restrict who can and can't enter their property. It doesn't make any sense, but its their right to be nonsensical about their property.
No cell phones, no problem. No guns, it should not be any different.
Absolutely, but in many states (MA being one of them), you can order me to leave, but you cannot have me prosecuted simply because I am lawfully armed and it is against your property rules - any more than you have have me prosecuted for violating a dress code. (assuming, in both cases, a willingness to leave immediately and peacefully when so ordered by the person in control of the property).I can certainly choose to not let you in if you are armed.
Possession Restrictions
A person is guilty of interfering with the legislative process when he possesses a weapon from which a shot may be discharged, either loaded or unloaded, within any building where:
Either house of the General Assembly is located;
Any committee, member, officer or employee of the General Assembly has an official office; or
Any committee of the General Assembly is holding a public hearing.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 2-1e(c).
No person, unless specifically licensed or privileged to do so, may carry a firearm on the property of an elementary or secondary school or at a school-sponsored activity. Section 53a-217b.
A state administrative regulation states that possession of a dangerous weapon in a shelter for the homeless constitutes good cause for expulsion or suspension from the shelter. Conn. Agencies Regs. § 17-590-5. Similarly, possession of firearms on the grounds of the Connecticut Department of Veteran Affairs constitutes cause for an immediate involuntary discharge from programs administered by that Department. Section 27-102l(d)-132.
Administrative regulations also prohibit firearms:
In any state park or forest except as authorized by the Department of Environmental Protection (section 23-4-1(c));
In Bluff Point Coastal Preserve, except for certain authorized persons (section 23-4-4(B)(3));
Inside of or within 50 feet of any magazine or in or around any trucks or other vehicles containing explosives (sections 29-349-135, 29-349-198); and
Inside or within 50 feet of any plant, area, or warehouse used for mixing, packaging, or storing blasting agents (section 29-349-274).
Concealed weapons permit holders may be subject to additional location limits. Please see the Location Limits subsection below for further information.
Location Limits
A permit does not authorize a person to carry a handgun on any premises where the possession or carrying of a handgun is prohibited by the person who owns or controls the premises. Section 29-28(e).
Concealed handgun permit holders may be subject to generally applicable possession prohibitions. Please see the Possession Restrictions and Transportation of Firearms sections above for further information.
2. Is the carrying of a handgun on premises with a posted sign banning firearms critical to a permit revocation decision?
The law is silent on this issue. The pertinent statute reads as follows: “[T]he issuance of a permit to carry a pistol or revolver does not thereby authorize the possession or carrying of a pistol or revolver in any premises where the possession or carrying of a pistol or revolver is otherwise prohibited by law or is prohibited by the person who owns or exercises control over such premises” (CGS § 29-28(e)).
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
DOCKET NO. CR070211668 SUPERIOR COURT
STATE OF CONNECTICUT J. D. HARTFORD
Plaintiff, at G.A. 12, MANCHESTER
v.
GOLDBERG, JAMES, JULY 20, 2007
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS
INTRODUCTION
The Defendant has been charged with Breach of the Peace in the Second Degree, in violation of C.G.S. § 53a-181. The acts show that the Defendant was arrested as he sat in a Chili's restaurant, waiting for his take-out order. Apparently, the manager of Chili's observed the Defendant and saw that lie was carrying' a pistol in a holster that was partially visible under the defendant's T-shirt on his hip. The Defendant has a valid permit to carry a weapon in Connecticut pursuant to C.G.S. § 29-28. Alarmed by her observation of the Defendant's holstered pistol, the manager called the police who responded by coming to the restaurant and taking the Defendant into custody. Although there appeared to be some commotion in the restaurant after the restaurant staff moved all other customers away from the Defendant prior to his arrest, at no time was the Defendant threatening or unruly, and the Defendant never tried to call attention to the weapon in any way. In short, any commotion or disturbance in the restaurant was caused solely by the reaction of the restaurant manager and staff, and not by the Defendant. "
ARGUMENT
EVEN WHEN TAKEN IN A LIGHT FAVORABLE TO THE PROSECUTION; THE EVIDENCE IS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR BREACH OF THE PEACE.
"
Pursuant to C.G.S. § 54-56, a court may, at any time, upon motion by the defendant, dismiss any criminal case against the defendant and order the defendant to be discharged if, in the opinion of the court, "there is not sufficient evidence or cause to justify the bringing or continuing of such information or the placing of the person accused therein on tria1." In determining whether the evidence proffered by the state is adequate to avoid dismissal, such proof must be viewed in the light most favorable to the state. State v. Howell, 98 Conn. App. 369, 908 A.2d 1145 (2006).
The charge in this case has been brought under C.G.S. § 53a-181, which defines the crime of Breach of the Peace in the Second Degree and provides that the crime may be committed by one of six different actions:
A person is guilty of Breach of the peace in the. second degree when, with intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, such person: (1) Engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior in a public place; or (2) assaults or strikes another; or (3) threatens to commit any crime against another person or such other person's property; or (4) publicly exhibits, distributes, posts up or advertises any offensive, indecent or abusive matter concerning any person; or (5) in a public place, uses abusive or obscene language or makes an obscene gesture; or (6) creates a public and hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which such person is not licensed or privileged to do. For purposes of this section, "public place" means any area that is used or held out for use by the public whether owned or operated by public or private interests.
,
Based on the evidence in this case, it appears that only subsections (1), (3), or (6) could conceivably be relevant, and with regard to each of these possible statutory violations, the evidence simply cannot support a conviction.
In order for the court to determine that the Defendant engaged in threatening behavior under subsections (1), (3), or (6), it would have to conclude that the mere presence of an individual in a public place with a partially concealed weapon would constitute threatening behavior. Such a conclusion would be in complete conflict with the plain language of C.G.S. §§ 29-28 (b) and (e), which specifically allow the holder of a permit to carry a pistol or revolver to wear that weapon anywhere in the state except where specifically prohibited by law:
Upon the application of any person having a bona fide residence or place of business within the jurisdiction of any such authority, such chief of police, warden or selectman may issue a temporary state permit to such person to carry a pistol or revolver within the state, provided such authority shall find that such applicant intends to make no use of any pistol or revolver which such applicant may be permitted to carry under such permit other than a lawful use and that such person is a suitable person to receive such permit
C.G.S.A. § 29-28 (b) (emphasis added). The only restriction contained in the statute with regard to the locations where a permit-holder may carry a weapon is contained in § 29-28(e), which provides:
The issuance of any permit to carry a pistol or revolver does not thereby authorize the possession or carrying or a pistol or revolver in any premises where the possession or carrying of a pistol or revolver is otherwise' prohibited by law or is prohibited by the person who owns or exercises control over such premises.
There is no evidence whatsoever that the carrying of a concealed weapon in Chili's restaurant is either prohibited by law or, is prohibited by a rule or policy adopted by Chili's restaurants.
Thus, the Defendant's conduct was affirmatively approved under Connecticut law, and the Court cannot find that the Defendant's lawful conduct may be punished under a different section of Connecticut law. Indeed, the Connecticut Supreme Court has held in another context that local authorities may not frustrate the purpose of the weapons permit statute by restricting what is permitted under the statute. See Dwyer v. Farrell 193 Conn. 7, 475 A.2d 257 (1.984) (local authorities could not restrict the sale of handguns in a manner permitted by § 29-28, even though the local action did not expressly conflict with the language of that section, as the legislative purpose underlying § 29-28 was frustrated by the local action).
Moreover, the prosecution cannot possibly show that in acting in conformity with state law and the terms of his weapons permit, the Defendant either intentionally or recklessly intended to cause a public disturbance. Under the circumstances of this case, there is nothing to show that a reasonable person would have believed the carrying of a concealed weapon would have caused a public disturbance, and there is no evidence to support the conclusion that a reasonable person would have felt threatened by the Defendant's conduct or would have reacted to the Defendant as did the restaurant staff.
There is no claim that the Defendant intentionally breached the peace, but rather the state is claiming that the Defendant acted recklessly. Under C.G.S. § 53a-3(13),
a person acts "recklessly" with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregarding it constitutes s a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.
(Emphasis added.) The state cannot offer evidence that would support the conclusion that the Defendant's lawful carrying of a weapon pursuant to a permit was a "gross deviation" from reasonable conduct.
Further, as was noted in State v. 'DeLoreto, 265 Conn. 145, 827 A.2d 671 (2003), § 53a-181 is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad precisely because the issue of whether a particular act or statement may properly be considered to be a threat is governed by an objective standard. The court held in State v. DeLoreto that a conviction under the statute requires specific proof that the defendant intentionally or recklessly threatened a crime that would, cause either a public disturbance, and further pointed out that the essence of a true threat is that a "reasonable person" would perceive that a threat was intended by the defendant. See also State v. Woff,; 237 Conn. 633, 678 A.2d 1369 (1996) (mens rea instruction with respect to breach of the peace which simply restated pertinent statutory language and referred to generalized instruction that the court had given on intent was inadequate as it did not require a finding that the predominant intent was to cause what a reasonable person operating under contemporary community standards would consider a disturbance to or impediment of a lawful activity); State v. Hoskins 35 Conn. Supp. 587, 401 A.2d 619 (1978) (evidence did not establish that defendant minister’s painted slogans, which charged that Jews murdered Jesus Christ, were intended or likely to produce imminent disorder; thus, defendant's conviction for violating breach of peace statute could not be sustained).
Moreover, it is well established that an overreaction to a defendant's lawful conduct cannot establish the elements of breach of the peace. For example, the court held in State v. Collis, 14 Conn. App. 440, 540 A.2d 1062 (1988), that the evidence was legally insufficient to show that the defendant committed a breach of peace by engaging in threatening behavior simply because the alleged victims felt threatened, where the evidence showed that the defendant simply drove slowly past two young women several times, and may have on one occasion spoken to one of them, and that he then stopped the car and opened the door. The court summarily found that such conduct could not violate § 53a-18l (1).
Also, it has been recognized explicitly in a number of other jurisdictions that the literal breadth of the definition of a breach of the peace "does not mean. . . that lawful and proper conduct may constitute a breach of peace just because it provokes violence or disorder." "O'Leary v. Commonwealth 441 S.W.2d 150, 154 (Ky. 1969). Rather, "the mere fact that the exercise of a lawful right may result in a disturbance or breach of the peace does not make the exercise of that right a violation of the law so long as the right is exercised in a peaceful manner and without force or violence or threats of same." Briggs v. State, 367 S.W.2d 750, 754 (Ark. 1963), vacated on other grounds, Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964). See Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1963) (plaintiffs, white persons who were arrested when they were eating peaceably with Negroes in desegregate restaurant and were subsequently tried for disorderly conduct, were entitled to judgment as matter of law on false imprisonment count against officers who had arrested them; the plaintiffs' conduct could not be reasonably considered to be a breach of the peace simply because a crowd of bystanders were provoked into disorder as a result of their conduct).
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth above, this Court must dismiss the charge against the Defendant, James Goldberg, pursuant to its authority under C.G.S. § 54-56.
PROBATION STATISTICS
By Christopher Reinhart, Senior Attorney
Number of Probation Cases by Statute—June 1, 2007
29-28 PISTOL PERMIT VIOLATION 1
The implication here is that if they even have a policy prohibiting it then you're in violation, with or without a sign.
Rob,
I'm with you totally. Your comment...Was a lightbulb moment for me.
GSG - One thing of note in the goldberg case is that there was not any signage displayed at the restaurant. So this case is purely about carrying, accidtnally flashing and your right to carry openly.
This is not a "ruling" on that section of the law, and it really doesn't do much to change the landscape - things remain vaguely defined.