Hightower's only argument as to why these postdeprivation procedures are inadequate is that the standard of review places the burden of proof on the individual challenging the revocation. Hightower failed to develop the argument or cite to any pertinent authority in her opening brief, so this claim is waived. See United States v. Berk, 652 F.3d 132, 137 n.5 (1st Cir. 2011) (issues not developed in the opening brief are waived), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1650 (2012).
We also reject the notion that the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, in conjunction with an evidentiary hearing where the aggrieved individual may introduce evidence to demonstrate that the licensing decision was erroneous, renders the postdeprivation judicial process inadequate.
While I will take the Court's word for it that the first argument was undeveloped, it is incomprehensible that the current standard of review in a PJR is Constitutional (meaning (a) the burden is on the the aggrieved individual; and (b) it's an arbitrary and capricious standard). Such standard may have been acceptable when it was only a privilege to own firearms in the Commonwealth, but in the wake of McDonald, such a standard cannot be upheld to protect one's fundamental right to own a firearm.