Conviction on carrying charge reversed, and conviction on improper storage remanded for new trial
"A contextual reading of these statutory provisions, focused particularly on firearms in motor vehicles, leads us to conclude that the Legislature did not consider a locked motor vehicle itself to be a secure container for the storage of firearms. "
"A contextual reading of these statutory provisions, focused particularly on firearms in motor vehicles, leads us to conclude that the Legislature did not consider a locked motor vehicle itself to be a secure container for the storage of firearms. "
COMMONWEALTH vs. Amaury REYES.
SJC-11270.
Essex. Oct. 1, 2012. - Jan. 29, 2013.
Firearms. Constitutional Law, Vagueness of statute, Right to bear arms. Due Process of Law, Vagueness of statute. Practice, Criminal, Directed verdict, Instructions to jury. Words, "Secured," "Locked container."
COMPLAINT received and sworn to in the Salem Division of the District Court Department on April 26, 2010.
The case was tried before Matthew J. Nestor, J.
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court.
Michael A. Laurano for the defendant.
Marcia H. Slingerland, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
Keith G. Langer, for Commonwealth Second Amendment, Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ.
CORDY, J.
The defendant, Amaury Reyes, was convicted of improperly carrying a firearm in a motor vehicle in violation of G.L. c. 140, § 131C (a ) (carrying statute), and unlawfully storing a firearm (after leaving it in his motor vehicle) in violation of G.L. c. 140, § 131L (a ) and (b ) (storage statute). On appeal, the defendant argues that the storage statute is unconstitutionally vague in violation of his right to due process of law. He also contends that if the storage statute requires that a firearm stored in a locked motor vehicle be rendered further inoperable by locking it in an additional container or through the use of a tamper-resistant trigger lock, it unlawfully hinders his right to use the firearm in self-defense. Additionally, the defendant posits that there was insufficient evidence at trial to support his convictions under both the storage and carrying statutes. Finally, he asserts that the judge's jury instruction on the elements of the storage statute was deficient in that it failed to provide guidance on what qualifies as a "locked container." Based on these errors, the defendant asserts that he is entitled to either directed verdicts in his favor or a new trial.
We conclude that the defendant's arguments with respect to the constitutionality of the storage statute are without merit: the statute is neither impermissibly vague nor violative of his right to self-defense under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. We also conclude, however, that the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's conviction under the carrying statute and he is entitled to a directed verdict of not guilty on that charge. Further, because the judge did not adequately instruct the jury regarding what qualifies as a "locked container," we reverse his conviction under the storage statute and remand the case to the District Court for a new trial with directions to the trial judge to instruct the jury in a manner consistent with this opinion.
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