JRyan said:
So what you guys are saying is that I can feel free to move in that house if I want to buy it then right?
Because that is how I'm reading all of this.
I seem to be covered by a couple of those exceptions.
You can move into a home abutting a school and have all the firearms you want.
Back in 1990, Congress passed the "Gun Free School Zones Act" that
would have prohibited posession of a firearm within 1,000' of a school...
(b) DEFINITIONS- Section 921(a) of such title is amended by adding at the end the following:
`(25) The term `school zone' means--
`(A) in, or on the grounds of, a public, parochial or private school; or
`(B) within a distance of 1,000 feet from the grounds of a public, parochial or private school.
`(26) The term `school' means a school which provides elementary or secondary education, as determined under State law.
`(27) The term `motor vehicle' has the meaning given such term in section 10102 of title 49, United States Code.'.
(c) PENALTY- Section 924(a) of such title is amended by adding at the end the following:
`(4) Whoever violates section 922(q) shall be fined not more than $5,000, imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the term of imprisonment imposed under this paragraph shall not run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed under any other provision of law.'.
(d) EFFECTIVE DATE- The amendments made by this section shall apply to conduct engaged in after the end of the 60-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.
http://cwx.prenhall.com/bookbind/pubbooks/burns4/medialib/docs/gunfree.htm
Fortuantly, that law was ruled unconstitional by the SCOTUS under the Commerce clause...
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) was the first United States Supreme Court case since the Great Depression to set limits to Congress's power under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
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Background
Alfonso Lopez, Jr carried a handgun and cartridges into his high school, Edison High, San Antonio, Texas. He was charged with violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act (of 1990), 18 U.S.C. § 922(q).
The government argued that possession of a firearm in a school zone can be expected to lead to violent crime, which can be expected to affect economy and traveling in the area, as well as to produce a citizenry with less of an education due to the distraction of the violent crime and in the long-term, a weaker economy. Thus, possession of a firearm at a school falls under jurisdiction of the Commerce Clause.
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Supreme Court decision
The Supreme Court held that while Congress had broad lawmaking authority under the Commerce Clause, it was not unlimited, and did not apply to something as far from commerce as carrying handguns, especially when there was no evidence that carrying them affected the economy on a massive scale. (A later case, United States v. Morrison (2000), ruled that Congress could not make such laws even when there was evidence of aggregate affect.)
Chief Justice Rehnquist, delivering the opinion of the court, wrote that Congress had the power to regulate only:
* the channels of commerce,
* the instrumentalities of commerce, and
* action that substantially affects interstate commerce.
He dismissed the government's argument, reasoning that if Congress could regulate something so far removed from commerce, then it could regulate anything, and since the Constitution clearly creates Congress as a body with enumerated powers, this could not be so. He concludes:
To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States. Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long steps down that road, giving great deference to congressional action. The broad language in these opinions has suggested the possibility of additional expansion, but we decline here to proceed any further. To do so would require us to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not presuppose something not enumerated, and that there never will be a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local. This we are unwilling to do.
It is important to note that although the ruling stopped a decades-long trend of inclusiveness under the commerce clause, it did not reverse any past ruling about the meaning of the clause.
The Court specifically looked to four factors in their determination.
1. Whether the activity was non-economic as opposed to economic activity; previous cases involved economic activity.
2. Jurisdictional element: whether the gun had moved in interstate commerce.
3. Whether there had been Congressional findings of an economic link between guns and education.
4. How attenuated the link was between the regulated activity and interstate commerce.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Lopez