I recieved this email this morning. It has a few good points.
Geopolitical Diary: Pyongyang 's U.S. Independence Day Fireworks
July 05, 2006 04 30 GMT
North Korea launched several missiles into the East Sea , aka the Sea of Japan, early July 5 local time; the first launch apparently coincided with the July 4 local time U.S. launch of the space shuttle. The tests come amid increased diplomatic efforts to prevent a launch of the Taepodong-2 and to bring North Korea and the United States back to the six-party nuclear talks. Pyongyang apparently has decided these efforts were insufficient.
Reports continue to conflict, but it now appears North Korea tested as many as four missiles, including a medium-range Rodong missile and a Taepodong-2 long-range missile. North Korea appears to have launched two medium-range missiles, either Scuds or Rodongs, prior to launching the Taepodong. The two initial tests may have been launched to gauge U.S. and Japanese response or as decoys prior to the Taepodong-2 launch. The gamble didn't pay off, however, as the Taepodong-2 apparently failed just 35 seconds after liftoff.
For North Korea , any launch was risky. Pyongyang is extremely reluctant to test any of its medium- or long-range missiles, as such tests expose the capabilities -- or lack thereof -- of its weapons systems. North Korea has only tested its primary, medium-range Rodong missile once. Likewise, the Taepodong-1 was only launched once, in 1998, when it failed to place a satellite into orbit. If confirmed, the current Taepodong-2 test was also likely a satellite launch, offering Pyongyang enough ambiguity regarding whether its launch related to civilian or military ends to keep countries like South Korea , Japan and the United States from coming to a common plan of follow-on action.
The failure of the Taepodong-2 test is not that unusual, given North Korea 's minimal testing so far. Both the United States and the Soviet Union also had plenty of failures early on. Only later did those two nations throw more money, technology and individuals on their space-development programs. This will do little to assuage Pyongyang 's frustration at its failure, however.
Even so, a failed launch may ultimately offer North Korea greater choices than other scenarios might have. Had Pyongyang succeeded, even Seoul might have thought twice about continued economic contacts with the North. And had the United States or Japan shot the missile down, Pyongyang would very quickly have been forced to decide whether to consider the move an act of war and launch a counterstrike, or just complain loudly and demonstrate its own impotence. A failed test, if a test was to be carried out, provides renewed avenues for negotiation.
China will be the first to offer its services in figuring out what next for North Korea . Pyongyang will be more beholden to Beijing following the test, as North Korea tries to gauge its options and how best to play down the failure. It has lost its missile leverage now, and will need its northern neighbor even more. For its part, China will take this added leverage with the North for its own negotiations with the United States .
The failed launch may bring Washington back into the six-party talks or to the informal six-party talks Beijing recently suggested as U.S. officials breathe a collective sigh of relief at not having been forced to decide whether to try to shoot down the North Korean missile. Thus, Washington can say it was ready for the launch without having had to prove its anti-missile system in a real-life situation. And the United States also enjoys the advantage of a North Korea weakened for now by the failed test.
The question now is what happens inside Pyongyang . A failure of a major economic, political and military expenditure could quickly lead to infighting as blame is assigned and passed and next steps are debated. While North Korean leader Kim Jong Il has shown himself quite adept at managing his place in power, the loss of a key political lever is sure to create at least a brief internal political crisis. While the North may have already thought through the implications of failure, thinking and facing reality are rather different. If Pyongyang makes quick, clear steps in the coming days, it will suggest it was either well-prepared for failure or aborted the launch itself. If not, expect to see the North close in on itself, and perhaps turn to neighbor China for advice and protection.
Either way, a major shift in North Korean behavior can be expected in the coming months.