You seem to be missing the 140/129c aspect of things. You dont need a crime or suspicion of a crime, and I dont think the initial inquiry is at Terry stop levels.
Hold those thoughts (see below).
I now see your use of Haskell and Alvarado, I appreciate the explanation. I also think that neither of those cases are relevant here, but it certainly makes for an interesting argument. ...
I've done a disservice to forum readers by neglecting to link to the actual cases. That's not how I want to roll.
(And I sure hope that my abstracts in
#159 accurately summarize the cases).
An aside: I feel for Mike-Mike, because on p. 269 of Alvarado, the SJC cites and quotes Couture. Offhand, the SJC seems to consider Couture more relevant than was even casually obvious to me from its abstract. I guess that's why they pay the SJC the big bucks.
... It would be nice if one or two of the litigators here on NES would offer up their opinions, but we know lawyers wont do that. ...
Well, this case law is probably so obscure and new that at best I'd expect lawyers to speak in terms of probabilities/odds - not certainties.
... Going in front of a jury and trying to use Haskell as a defense as to why you didnt answer the cops question ("He didnt demand it. The law says demand, not ask!") seems like an awful big gamble to me.
Haskell is so subtle that even the decision itself apologizes for it. (See below).
First the relevant part of c140 §129c:
Any person ... shall on demand of a police officer or other law enforcement officer, exhibit his license to carry firearms ...
So I absolutely agree that a LEO can (at whim)
tell anyone, "show me your LTC",
and they're required to show it.
Now the core of Haskell:
... The police, therefore, need not administer Miranda warnings before demanding that a suspect in custody produce one of the documents listed in § 129C.
The problem in this case, however, is one of form. Lieutenant Reilly did not order the defendant to produce or exhibit a license to possess the revolver found in his car; he asked the defendant whether he had such a license. As subtle as this distinction may seem, Lieutenant Reilly's question was an invitation to "relate a factual assertion or disclose information," ... specifically, an admission that the defendant was in violation of G. L. c. 140, § 129C. It was therefore a request for a testimonial communication that entitled the defendant to the Fifth Amendment's protections, including the right to refuse to answer. ...
So my take on Haskell is that if a LEO
asks "do you have an LTC" of an un-Mirandized detainee (even during a Terry stop), then the detainee has the option to take the 5th and not self-incriminate by not answering. (The SJC doesn't explore the propriety of silence when the detainee
has a perfectly
cromulent LTC in their possession).
As far as juries go... I imagine that the defense would preemptively move to suppress any testimony (and fruits) impermissible under Haskell/Miranda. And if that removed an essential element, I imagine a motion for those charge(s) to be dismissed, without presentation to the jury.
But in the case of the OP's buddy, it's a thin hypothetical to imagine he'd get charged, but only with 129c. Probably the sheriff either shrugs it off, or goes FR with other charges.
Ive never been on masscops, from what Im told, there isnt much discussion on there about topics like this.
They have a Law Review forum (
423 discussions; 2 (unrelated) Alvarado hits), a Court Decisions subforum (
199 discussions; 6 (unrelated) Alvarado hits), and are not above bringing in case law when discussing current events (2 Alvarado hits). Ironically, in 2011 our own Officer Obie did cite the Alvarado case in one news story -
a tragic police involved fatal shooting in Plymouth, although no illicit firearms were involved.
At its best, it seems an admirable form of continuing legal education.