Yes, but as I see it, the termination of the criminal liability is the dismissal, not the CWOF. And that is why the above quote from §921 is important. §921 cares about is of the charges which dictate the possible sentence. Charges = criminal liability. Post conviction = sentencing for already adjudicated findings of guilt. The sentencing, and subsequent parole, follow on from the charges. Until you have disposition of the former, you can't have the other (otherwise that would violate In re winship...
![Wink [wink] [wink]](/xen/styles/default/xenforo/smilies.vb/002.gif)
) so there is disposition of the charge, and then disposition of the sentence. Again, this is logically. I don't doubt that people in the system see it differently.
Sentencing is bounded by the max sentence allowed for in the statute. Sentence is disposed of upon the completion of probation or the completion of the max sentence, which ever comes first*. But that is disposition of sentence, not the charges. The law in §921 et seq; only cares for the conviction and max possible sentence, not for the sentence actually imposed or anything that comes after it.
If you think I am being absurd, read Logan v US (2007) and get a picture for the absurdity that ATF has argued-- AND WON-- in the past based on the definitions of §921.
ETA: * this assumes a suspended sentence on the probation side. Not dealing with complex mixes of probation and sentencing.